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"INVOLUNTARY STRICT FORECLOSURE" UNDER
SECTION 9-505(2) OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: TARPIT FOR THE TARDY CREDITOR
Wendell H. Holmes*

INTRODUCTION
Secured parties everywhere s hould harken to the tale of poor Byron
Millican.1 It seems that in May 1979, Mr. Millican (d/b/a Millican Auto
Sales) had the misfortune to sell a used Buick Skylark to one Jenny Tur
ner, taking in payment a retail installment contract for the price plus

finance charge totalling $4,228.20.• The contract was sold with recourse
by Millican to the First National Bank of New Albany, Mississippi. Un
fortunately for Mr. Millican, but all too familiar to those in the used car
busine ss, T urner proved to be a poor credit risk; after making only a few
of the sched uled 36 payments, Turner defaulted. 8

Even more unfortunately for Mr. Millican, the car, once located by
the rep osses sion agent of the Bank,' was a mess.11 It attracted no interest
rom potential buyers after the Bank reassigned the contract to Millican
m July 1981. 8 Finally, in February 1982, Millican sued Turner for the
amount he had paid the bank upon reassignment, interest, collection fees,
and costs. The trial
court ultimately held for Turner. No doubt to the

�

amazement of both Millican and his attorney, in Millican v. Turner' the
upreme Court of Mississippi upheld the lower court's basic interpreta

�

tion of section 9-505(2)8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC): If Mil

lican's retention of the car for six months before filing suit was "an
unreasonably long time," he would be deemed to have retained the car in
satisfaction of the debt and barred from suing on the underlying obligaAssociate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A. 1974, Mill·
•
saps Colle ge; J.D.
1977, Tulane University.
1. See Millican v. Turner, 503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987).
2. Id. at 290.
3. Id.

4.

There

as to timing: Turner claimed the repossession

was substantial disagreemen t
��rred in "Augus
t or December of 1979"; Millican placed it in the "spring of 1981." Id. at
5 . Acco rding to the court, when the repo man located the car, "the tires were flat, the
.
win
ds hield was broken, the inside door panels were loose, and grass had grown up around
the car, as
if it had been abandoned." Id.
6. Millican claimed that he attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell the car for 10 to 12
rnonths after reas signmen
t. Id.
7.
8.

ute,

503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987).
Miss. ConE ANN. § 75-9-505(2) (Supp. 1989). For the full uniform text of the stat

see infra text at note 44.

289

290
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tion.' The court remanded the case for a factual determination of
whether Millican's delay in acting was unreasonably long.10
Imagine the incredulity with which Mr. Millican must have received
the news that he might have discharged a debt of at least $2,583.90 (the
amount he was required to pay the Bank) by retaining possession, for six
months prior to filing suit, of a car with an estimated worth o f $800.00. 11
On the other hand, had Mr. Millican-or his lawyer-been attentive to
the caselaw developing under section 9-505(2), he might have been spared
any shock.
No doubt it comes as little surprise that more cases interpreting arti
cle 9 of the UCC deal with issues of default than any other single topic.
In turn, within the area of default the preponderance of cases has in
volved the effect of allegedly commercially unreasonable sales of collat
11
eral on the secured party's right to a deficiency under section 9-504.
Likewise, scholarly writing on default has f ocused primarily upon section
9-504 and the problems attendant to resale.18 Largely unnoticed, however,

9. Millican, 50 3 So. 2d at 291 -92. The history of the litigation is, itself, fairly interest
ing. Turner first d efended on the ground that Millican had breached his duties under § 9504 in making a commercially unreasonable sale and not giving her notice of the sale. No
sale having been made, of course, that argument did not get very far, and Turner eventually
confessed a motion to dismiss her counterclaim for violation of § 9-504. Id. at 290. However,
Turner thereafter amended her answer to raise retention in satisfaction of § 9-505 (2). The
trial court (sitting without a jury) returned a verdict for Turner based on both § 9-505(2)
and common law accord and satisfaction. Turner wisely elected not to pursue the accord
and satisfaction theory on appeal, since the facts did not support it. See RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1 97 9) (defining "accord" a s a contract whereby a party promises
to accept a substituted p erformance in satisfaction of an existing duty on the part of the
performing party). Since there was no mutual assent to any settlement, an accord and satis·
faction could not have occurred.
For further discussion of the invocation of accord and satisfaction in cases under § 9505(2), see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
10. Millican, 50 3 So. 2d at 291 -92. The court suggested that the trier of fact should
consider, inter alia, the type of collateral, depreciation rate, and relevant market, and that
expert testimony might w ell be introduced to aid the fact-finder. Id.
11. Id. at 290. Note also the corresponding evaporation of whatever settlem ent lever·
age Millican might otherwise have had prior to t h e appeal.
1 2. For general background and collections of cases on this issue, see 9 R. ANDERSON.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-504:7 9 to :94 (1 985); 9 W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LE WIS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-507:07 (1 986 ); T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE
COMMENTARY AND LAW D IGEST § 9-504[A][8) (Cum. S upp. No. 1 1 989); J. W HITE & R. SUM·
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-1 9 (3d ed. 1 988). For further discussion , see infra
notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
13. For recent articles on this issue, see Donaldson, Commercially Reasonable Dispo·
. .
s1twn of Collateral Under Article 9 of the UCC: The Question of the Burden of Proof, 20
U.C.C. L.J. 307 (1 988 ); Garner & Alber, Disposition of Repossessed Goods Under Article 9
of th � Texas U.C.C., 1 1 Tux. TECH L. REV. 56 3 (1 980 ); Page, A Secured Party's Right to a
Deficiency Judgment After Non-Compliance with the Resale Provisions of Article 9, 60
N.D.L. REv. 5 31 (1 984 ); Rudow, Determining the Commercial Reasonableness of Sale of
e�ossessed Collateral, 1 9 U.C.C. L.J. 1 39 (1986); Comment, Failure of Notice in the Dispo·
sitwn of Collateral: The Effect on Debtor and Creditor Rights Under the Alabama Uni·
form Commercial Code, 14 CuMB. L. REv. 181 (1 984); Comment, California Article 9 No
_
Defic1ency
Rule: Undermining the Secured Party's Security, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 1 5 3 (1982);

�
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is an ever-expanding number of cases where the secured party does not
dispose of the collateral, at least for some more or less extended time, but
rather retains it without communicating with the debtor. When he finally
sues on the debt-with or without having first sold the collateral-the
question addressed in Millican is posed: What, if anything, are the conse
quences of delay? Since the "strict foreclosure" provision of the UCC,
section 9-505(2), 14 governs expressly only those instances in which a se
cured party notifies the debtor of his desire to keep the collateral in satis
faction of the debt, courts have commonly gone beyond the language of
the Code to fashion a response. With increasing frequency, the response,
as in Millican, is that section 9-505(2) can be forced upon the secured
party as well as elected by him-in the words of one authority, that the
sec ured party may be subject to "involuntary strict foreclosure. nu

This article will analyze the concept of involuntary strict foreclosure
and attempt to place it within the broader context of creditors' remedies
and debtors' rights under part 5 of article 9. The article first reviews the
rem edial schem e of part 5 and focuses upon the ostensible role of section

9-505(2) within the statutory pattern. It then discusses the real and per
sonal property analogues to section 9-505(2) and demonstrates that they
are imperfect frames of reference for interpretation of section 9-505(2).
Thereafter, the article reviews three lines of cases that have developed
un der sectio n 9-505(2) and suggests that the proper approach is taken by
those courts that have rejected the notion of involuntary strict foreclo
sure. The article
concludes, however, that the judicial experience with
section 9-505(2), just as with the resale cases under section 9-504, illus
tr ates that the
remedial provisions of part 5 of article 9 are fundamen
tally flawed and in need of revision.
I.
A.

THE ARTICLE 9 REMEDIAL SCHEME

Creditors' Remedies

The default and realization rules of part 5 of article 916 give the se
cured party
maximum freedom of choice in formulating a plan for collect
in g the balance
of the secured indebtedness. The fundamental rule is
� tated in section 9-501: "[The secured party] may reduce his claim to
Judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any
av ilable jud
icial pr edure . . . . The rights and remedies referred to in
�
this subsection
are cumulative."17

�

Comment, The
Misbehavior
Secured Creditor's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After
U der
)
(19
.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3), 21 Hous. L. REv. 359
n
84
.
14. For the full text of the section, see infra note 44 and accompanying t ext.

W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, supra note 12, § 9-505:09.
u.c.c. §§ 9-501 to 507 (1987).
.
17. U.C.C. § 9-50l(l) (!987). The primary purpose for this state��nt 1s to reject the
nal sales transac
doctrine of
elec tion of remedies which applied at common law to cond1t10
but not both;
tion s. U
nder this rule, the ven or could either repossess or sue on the debt,
y Damage � �nd
Statutor
assertion of
Warren,
e.g.,
See,
eith er right would forfeit the other.
the Conditio
9-501(1) and (5) v1t1ate
nal Sale, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 290-91 (1959). Sections

15.
16.

.

d
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The Code then proceeds in a logical progression. Under section 9-503,
default entitles the secured party to possession of the collateral; this may
be effected either through judicial proceedings such as replevin or by self
help if there is no breach of the peace.18 Assuming that after d efault there
is no mutually negotiated settlement o f the secured party's claim,19 he
may proceed in regard to the collateral in two ways: either resale under
section 9-504 (with the right thereafter to sue for any deficiency30) or re
tention in full satisfaction of the indebtedness under section 9-505. In all
events, the rules are broad, generally non-technical, and keyed to the
standard of "commercial reasonableness." In the words of one commenta
tor, the goals of the Code are twofold:
First, to assure the highest possible realization price, a considerable dis
cretion is conferred upon the secured party seeking to realize upon his
collateral. There is a remarkable absenc e of stringent requirements for
mandatory public

sales, detailed public

notices, or other

specific

prohibitions. For the most part, the Code requires only that the secured
party must be "commercially reasonable" in making the disposition.
Second, the Code aims at increasing the ability of a court to review the
conduct of the secured party in the disposition of the collateral. An
explicit statutory grant permits the court to interfere p rospectively
with dispositions that will violate the Code requirements and to require
the payment of money damages when the defective dispositions have
already occurred.21

the idea of election. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C.,
47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 249 (1962). The Uniform Conditional Sales Act also rejected the elec
tion of remedies doctrine. U.C.S.A. § 24 (1918).
In theory, then, the secured party under article 9 can pursue various avenues for collec
tion simultaneously, subject only to the imperative that he cannot collect more than the
amount owed. White and Summers note, however, that the cases on "double-barrel" attacks
on debtors are split, with some courts allowing multiple remedies to be pursued simultane·
ously, while others force the secured party to exhaust one remedy before pursuing the other.
In either event, courts seem sensitive to the underlying problem of creditor harassment of
debtors. J. WHITE & R SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-4, at 1197-98.
18. u.c.c.§ 9-503 (1987).
19. The U.C.C. prohibits any pre-default waiver of rights by debtors. Id. § 9-504(3).
This was also the approach of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. U.C.S.A. § 2 6 (1918).
20. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1987).
21. Hogan, supra note 17, at 207. In so doing, the Code drafters drew heavily from
experience under the two most important pre-Code statutes, the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act (UCSA) and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA).
The UCSA contained detailed rules governing the seller's rights upon default. E.g., un·
less the seller gave the buyer prior notice of his intention to repossess under§ 17 (in which
case the buyer's redemption rights were eliminated), he was forced to hold the goods for 10
days, during which the buyer could redeem by complying with the terms of§ 18. In any
event, unless the seller elected to retain the goods under § 23, he was required under § 19 to
make a sale at public action, with detailed rules on time and notice (including posting and
publication i� some cases). As Grant Gilmore pointed out, not only did this virtually guar
antee a deficiency, but also it contained a plethora of possibilities for technical errors by the
seller that engendered constant challenges by defaulting buyers. G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN·
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 44.4, at 1227-28 (1965). The attempt (albeit largely unsuc·
cessful) of the Code drafters to encourage private rather than public sales is perhaps the
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Debtor's Rights

B.

The rights provided to the defaulting debtor under article 9 can be

easily summarized. First, the debtor is entitled to know what the secured
party intends t o do with the collateral. If the secured party plans to sell

it, then he must give the debtor notice of the sale unless the collateral is
perishable, is subject to a rapid decline in value, or is sold on a recognized
marke t. 22 If the creditor's intent is to keep it in satisfaction of the debt,
then he must give the debtor notice of this as well; and if the debtor
object s, he can force a sale. u In either event, if the collateral is sold, the
debtor has a right to any surplus remaining after payment of the ex
�ense s of disposition, the primary secured debt, and subordinate security
interests of which the sellin g secured party has been notified in writing. 24
The debtor also has a right of redemption.I&
·

While section 9-504 on resale is often said to be the central rule of
part 5 for the secured party,11 the key rules from the perspective of the
debtor are those found in section 9-507. Because of the importance of

most important legacy of the UCSA experience. U.C.C. § 9-504 official comment 1 (1977).
On the other hand, the UTRA was almost completely unregulated as regards default.
Under the UTR A, the
entruster could, after five-days notice to the trustee (either personal
or ordinary mail),
"sell the goods, documents or instrum ents for the trustee's account, at
public or private sale, and (could) at public sale himself become a purchaser." U.T.R.A. §
6(3){b). As Gilmore notes, rarely did the trustee have any equity to protect, and he asserts
th at th ere was
never a case in which an entruster was sued for improper disposition. G.
GILMORE, supra,
at 1228-30. The Code embraces the UTRA approach, but adds the talis

manic m andate of
commercial reasonableness and provision for judicial review under § 9507· See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
22. T he Code requires notice of the time and place of a public sale, or the time after
.
whi ch a private
sale is to be made. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987). The Code does not specify
arbitrary tim e
limits for either sale or notice except for the special case of consumer goods
unde r § 9-505(1). See infra
notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Code does not
explicitly dem
and even written notice, although the command that notice be "sent" in § 9-

504(3), coup led with the
definition of "send," connotes the contemplation of written notice.
See U.C.C.
§ 1-201(38)(1987) ("send" defined as "in connection with any writing or notice
· · to deposit in the
mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communi
cation"). In
any event, only the foolhardy creditor would rely upon oral ·(ergo objectively
�nverifiable) not
ice to satisfy § 9-504. The debtor may, of course, waive the right to notifica
ti on after d
efault. Id. § 9-504(3).
23. u.c.c. § 9-505(2) (1987).
24. Id. § 9 -504(1)(2).
·

25.

Id. § 9- 506:

At any time before the. secured party has disposed of collateral or entered
into a contract for its disposition under section 9-504 or before the obligation
has been discharged under section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured
Party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral
by tendering f ulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the

ex penses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and pre
paring the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent
pr ovided in the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys'
fee s and legal expenses.
26. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-9, at 1213 (§ 9-504 is "guts"

of part 5).

WAKE FOREST LA W REVIEW

294

[Vol. 26

section 9-507 to the thesis of this article, it is set forth in full below:
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition
has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose
security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the
disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per
cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential
plus 10 per cent of the cash price.
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale
at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not
made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either
sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market there
for or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his
sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commer
cial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in
a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two
preceding sentences with respect to sale also apply as may be appropri
ate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved
in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or
representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commer
cially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that any such ap
proval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any
disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable.27

While much of this section is self-explanatory, for present purposes
attention should be drawn to the first two sentences of subsection (1) .
The first sentence countenances pre-disposition judicial review of the se
cured party's conduct and authorizes the court to issue either mandatory
or prohibitory injunctions, as appropriate, to redress creditor misconduct,
The second sentence, however, deals with post-disposition review of cred
itor misconduct, on its face entitling the debtor to recover damages for
"any loss caused." Probably the key default issue under the Code, how
ever, has been what other relie f, beyond damages proved, is available to
the aggrieved debtor-most especially, the denial o f a deficiency
judgment 28
As previously noted, where the creditor fails to comply with the re
sale rules of section 9-504, the issue of his right to a deficiency has been
repeatedly litigated and the results well-documented in the academic
literature.29 While I see no need in this article to replow this ground at
.

27. U.C.C. § 9-507 (1987).
28. Obviously, other claims may be asserted: for example, damages in conversion for
wrongful repossession under § 9-503 .
29. For cases and commentary on this issue, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying
text.
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length, a brief summary is necessary for the reader who is not well-ac
quainted with this issue.30 In effect, three divergent lines of cases have
arisen: The "absolute bar" cases; the "rebuttable presumption" cases; and
the "damages only" cases.31
The absolute bar cases hold, on various theories, that the misbe
having creditor loses entirely his right to a deficiency. The seminal case,
Skeels v. Universal C.I. T. Credit Corp.,32 viewed the essential injury as

the loss of the debtor's right of redemption when deprived of notice and
the opportunity to bid at the sale. While other courts have espoused dif
ferent rationales, the basic premise is stated by Professor Gilmore: "We
may conclude that the secured party's compliance with the default provi
sions of Part 5-both the formal requirements of notice and the like and
the substantial requirement of a 'commercially reasonable sale'-is a con
dition precedent to the recovery of a deficiency."33
While Gilmore's prescience about much of the future of Article 9 is
undeniable, on this point he fell wide of the mark, because the majority of
jurisdictions have adopted the "rebuttable presumption" rule. The lead
ing case ; Norton v. First National Bank,34 held that the secured party
who failed to give notice was not absolutely barred from a de ficiency.
Rather, the court stated that it would "indulge the presumption in the
firs t instance that the collateral was worth at least the amount of the
debt, t hereby shifting to the creditor the burden of proving the amount
that shou ld reason ably have been obtained through a sale conducted ac
cor ding t o law. "35 By virtue of this decision and a series of others that
ensued,36 the rebuttable presumption rule also became known as the "Ar
kansas Rule."37 This name has now, however, assumed a delicious irony:
In 1987, Arkansas abandoned the rebuttable presumption rule in favor of

the absolute bar rule.se Whether this presages a more general shift in that
direction is, of course, too early to tell. 39
30.
For a recent case summarizing the various approaches, see Wang v. Wang, 440
N.W.2d 740
(S.D. 1989). Perhaps the most useful general discussio� is in J. W HITE &. R.
S UMME RS,
. treatise.
supra note 12, § 25-19, and the following text draws heavily upon their
31.

32.
196 4).
33.
34.
3 5.

The last characterization is that of the author only.

2 2 2 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963 ),
G. GILMORE, supra note 21,

§

240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538
Id. at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542.

vacated on other grounds, 335

F.2d 846 (3d Cir.

44.9.4, at 1264.

(1966).

36 . For summaries, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1 2,
nn. 20- 28.

§

25-19, at 1249-50

37. See e.g., Wang v. Wang, 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989).
38. First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37, 7 22 S.W.2d 555 (1987). It
embraced the
sh ould be
noted that this ideological shift is not unique. Georgia at one time
absolute bar
214 S.E.2d 373 (1975),
934,
Ga.
233
Mfg.,
ure
Furnit
rule, Gurwitch v. Luxrest
ns v. Burkett, 256 Ga. 855,
but in 1987 it
changed to the rebuttable preswnption rule. Emmo
353 S. .2d 908 1
( 987).
E
.
o� the issue, Wang v.
39. As of this writing the most recen t state supreme court c
as Rule, without acknowledgeWang, 440
N.W. 2d 740 (S.D. 1989), a dopted the "Arkans
ment tha t it is
no longer the rule in Arka nsas.
,

ai:�
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Finally, a smaller number of courts have read the Code literally and
found that the debtor is entitled only to the relief that section 9-507(1)
explicitly provides: a set-off for whatever damages he can prove he suf
fered as a result of the secured party's misdoings. An illustrative case is
Beneficial Finance Co. v. Young,40 in which the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that damages under section 9-507(1) adequately protected
debtors. The court specifically noted that part 5 is silent on any grounds
for denial of a deficiency and stated that any such forfeiture would be
impermissible as punitive damages not sanctioned by section 1 - 106.'1
Young and similar cases are no doubt correct in holding that part 5
of article 9 contains no suggestion of any intention to bar a creditor's
right to a deficiency based solely upon noncompliance with the statute.
Were that the end of the issue one could unreservedly endorse the result
in Young. Unfortunately, it is not. To say that an exclusive statutory
right to actual damages proved adequately protects debtors (at least in
the absence of affirmatively tortious conduct) is either breathtakingly dis
ingenuous or naive. Even the principal drafter of article 9, Professor Gil
more, referred to the "liability for loss" standard in section 9-507 (1) as a
rule "of almost childlike simplicity" and suggested that "the draftsmen
might have been better advised if they had spelled out their intentions
somewhat more clearly."41 It may be true, as Gilmore goes on to suggest,
that the drafters thought that it was self-evident that a proper resale was
a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency. That, after all, was the
almost universal result in cases construing the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act notwithstanding express provision for only a right to " actual dam
ages, if any," and in all events a statutory penalty o f "one-fourth of the
sum of all payments which have been made . . . plus interest. "43 We are
now, however, a generation away from the prior uniform security laws,
and many lawyers and judges who deal with these issues know only o f the
ucc.
Thus, it is not self-evident that the UCC does not mean just what it
says. What it says is, however, not a sufficient shield for the debtor in
many cases. To be sure, there are clearly cases in which technical non·
compliance does not injure the debtor in any quantifiable way. In those
cases, imposition of the "absolute bar" rule is surely penal, and one need
go no further than the Code language to reach an equitable result. It is
40. 612 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1980).
41. Id. at 1359. Under§ 1-106, punitive damages are recoverable only "as specifically
provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1987). The co urt stated that
the �nial of a deficiency is penal in nature and that Article 9 obviously has no provision for
punitive amages. However, the court went on to hold that such "punishment" of creditors
.
could be Justified by a showing of "malice, fraud, or oppression." Young, 612 P.2d at 1360.
For other cases adopting the "damages only" rule, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 12, § 25-19, at 1252 nn. 32-34.
42· G. �ILMORE, supra note 21,§ 44.9.2, at 1255. Interestingly, Louisiana, the last state
to enact Article 9, adopted the "damages only" position
statutorily. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:9-507(1) (Supp. 1991).
43. U.C.S.A. § 25 (1918); see G. GILMORE, supra
note 21,§ 44.9.2, at 1256-57.

�

�
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just as true that in other cases the debtor may very well suffer actual
injury but have neither the resources, sophistication, nor opportunity to
prove his damages at trial. In those instances, section 9-507(1) is simply
ineffective, and history has shown that ineffective remedial rules will in
variably lead courts to find some other means to police misconduct. The
"rebuttable presumption" rule may be the most reasonable way of doing
this. The place for such a device, however, is in the C ode itself, or inevita
bly conflicting interpretations of a purportedly uniform statute will
develop.
The purpose of this brief exegesis of the deficiency dilemma under
section 9 -504 is to suggest that there are basic shortcomings in the Code's
remedial scheme. What has seemingly gone unnoticed by many, however,
is that courts have found another tool for reviewing other forms of per
ceived creditor misconduct in the seemingly innocuous rule of "strict
foreclosure" under section 9-505. Before examining those cases in detail,
however, I will first discuss the literal provisions of section 9-505 and its
intended role in part 5 of article 9.

C.

Section 9-505

To the casual observer, the text of section 9-505 would appear to be
the source of little controversy because it seems that it would, as a practi
cal matter, b e rarely invoked:
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the
case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods or sixty
per cent of the loan in the case of another security interest in consumer
goods, and has not signed after default a statement renouncing or mod
ifying his rights under this Part a secured party who has taken posses
sion of collateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504 and if he fails
to do so within ninety days after he takes possession the debtor at his
option may recover in conversion or under Section 9-507(1) on secured
party's liability.
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collat
eral a secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such

proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has not signed after default a
statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this subsection. In
the case of consumer goods n o other notice need be given. In other
cases notice shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the
se cured party has received (before sending his notice to the debtor or

before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim
of a n i nterest in the collateral. If the secured party receives objection in
w ritin g from a person entitled to receive notification within twenty-one
days after the notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the
collateral under section 9-504. In the absence of such written objection
the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the

debtor's obligation."
44.

U.C.C. § 9.505 (1987). Prior to 1 972, notice was required to be given under subsec-
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The rationale of subsection (1) is clear: If a consumer debtor has
achieved substantial equity in the collateral-as he surely would upon
payment of sixty per cent of the price-then that equity should be pre
served by forcing the secured party to sell the collateral and presumably
turn the surplus over to the debtor.411 Likewise, the ninety-day rule recog
nizes that consumer goods ordinarily depreciate rapidly and that expedi
tious action by the creditor should be mandated.46 Not surprisingly, this
has generated very few reported cases."' In one sense, forcing a sale may
be perverse, because the rate of depreciation may effectively guarantee a
deficiency judgment. One should not overlook, however, that there is in
addition to recovery in conversion an express penalty for violation of this
section: the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal indebt
edness or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.49
At least one court has awarded this penalty where it exceeded the value
of the collateral."
The present focus is, of course, subsection (2). Obviously, after de
fault the secured party and debtor may enter into a negotiated settlement
that could entail the secured party's retention of the collateral plus pay
ment by the debtor of all, part, or n o amount of the deficiency in the
value of the collateral. If the secured party is satisfied with the collateral
alone, though, section 9-505(2) provides a unilateral means to the same
ends, so long as the debtor fails to object.
Section 9-505(2) is generally described as a rule of convenience. In
the words of the official comment, "[e]xperience has shown that the par
ties are frequently better off without a resale of the collateral; hence this
section sanctions [an) alternative arrangement."&0 So long as the debtor
tion (2) to all secured parties who had proper l y filed a financing statement against th e
debtor in addition to those whose interest was known to the secured party, and the required
.
time period was 30 days. U.C.C. § 9-505(2)(1962). The class of persons entitled to notice was
narrowed in 1972 to those who have given the secured party notice of their c l aims, and the

time shortened to 21 days. A similar change regarding notice to other creditors was made in
the resale rule. Compare U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962) with U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987 ) .
45 . U.C.C. § 9-505 official comment 1 (1987). U nder the U niform Condit ional Sal es
Act, resale (for any transaction) was mandatory i f the buyer had paid over 50% of the price.
U.C.S.A. § 19 (1918).
46. W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, supra note 12,
at 614. It should be

§ 9-505:02,

noted that this is the sole provision in article 9 requiring the secured party to dispose of the
collateral within an arbitrary time period.

47. Those few include Keller v. La Rissa, Inc., 60 Haw. 1, 586 P.2d 1017 (1978) ; Mar·
&
shall v. Fulton Nat'! Bank, 145 Ga. App. 190, 2 4 3 S.E.2d
266 (1978); Chicago City Bank
Trust Co. v. Anderson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 421, 325 N.E.2 d 701 (1975)· Michigan Nat'! Bank v.
'
Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970) ; Char ley v. Rico Motor Co. 82 N.M. 290,
'
480 P.2d 404 (1971).
48. u.c.c. § 9-507(1) (1987) .
49. See Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 75, 488 P.2d 127 (1971 ) (statutory dam
ages of $236.32 awarde d where conversion value
was $231.47) .
. 5o.
con 
·C �· § 9-505 official comment 1 ( 1 987 ) . It might be noted
that the statute
:

�

tams amb� g�ities that this article does not
seek to address. First, it speaks of the sec ured
(2)
P ty retammg the coll� teral "in satisfaction of the
debtor's ob ligation." U.C.C. § 9-505
( 87>· Presumably , this means retention
of all c ollateral in complete satisfaction of th e

:;
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would not expect to realize any appreciable surplus from the disposition
of the collateral, one would assume that he would be all too happy to be
absolved of his potential liability for a deficiency judgment (although he
is also losing not only the collateral but also the p ayments he has made).61
Gilmore explained the rationale for the rule as follows: "The best and
simplest way of liquidating any secured transaction, default having oc
curred, is fo r the secured party to keep the collateral as his own free of
the debtor's equity, waiving any claim to a deficiency judgment."51 The
only potential flaw Gilmore seems to have perceived in the process was
the possibility of oppressive forfeiture agreements, but he viewed this as
adequately addressed by "publicity through notice and the enlightened
self-interest of the debtor, competing secured creditors, and representa
tives of unsecured creditors in insolvency proceedings." 68

D.

Section 9-505(2) Analogues

Gilmore stated that the analogues of section 9-505(2) were twofold:
the land mortgagee's right to a decree of strict foreclosure and the condi
tional seller's right to eliminate the equity of redemption by repossessing
the goods. 64 While the Code rule shares characteristics of both, neither is
a perfect analogy. Indeed, the differences that exist suggest that even
taken literally section 9-505(2) may not be a particularly wise provision.
To begin with, strict foreclosure of a land mortgage clearly has one
effect in common with the Code rule: The mortgagor loses his equity of
obligation, b ut the Code is not explicit on this point. Of course, no one is hurt if the secured
party elects to retain part of the collateral i n satisfaction of all obligations, but such largesse
on the creditor's part is highly unlikely. More pernicious would be a proposal to retain all of
the collateral as satisfaction of only part of the obligation, meaning that a deficiency j udg
ment w o uld still be possible. The Code's language does not expressly foreclose this, but
surely it is beyond the policy of the statute. See w. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND's HANDBOOK ON
CHAPTER 9 LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW § 5:10 ( 1 990).
Moreover, the statute d oes not contemplate strict foreclosure through the initiative of
the debtor. Again, such an arrangement could be expressly negotiated, but what of the sim
ple aba ndo nment of the collateral by the debtor int o the secured party's possession? The
last state to adopt article 9, Louisiana, added non-uniform amendments to § 9-505 to ad
dress this. Under the Louisiana version, abandonment or surrender of collateral by a con
sumer is deemed to be an offer in satisfaction of the debt or for sale, but the secured party
will be deemed to have accepted the goods i n satisfaction of the debt unless he gives con
trary notice to the debtor within 20 days. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-505(3) (Supp. 1 990).
Conversely, i n cases not involving consumer goods, abandonment or s urrender of the collat
eral is deemed to be for the purpose of sale, absent contrary written agreement. Id. § 10:9505 (4) .
Of course, in other jurisdictions silent retention of the collateral following abandonment
can give rise to the involuntary strict foreclosure problem that is the s ubject of this article.
51. Hogan, supra note 17, at 215 n. 51.
52. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1220.
53. Id. at 1226. The proceedings of the New York Law Revision Commission likewise
reflect no aware ness of the potential for i nvoluntary strict foreclosure See 2 Stste of New
:
.
Yor k, Report of the Law Revision Commission and Record of Hea rmgs on the Umform
Commercial Code 1 113, 1170-71 ( 1 954).
54.

G. GILMORE,

supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1220.
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redemption. 11 Indeed, strict foreclosure historically developed in response
to the recognition of redemption rights and was initially the only means
to their termination.69 However, in America strict f oreclosure did not nec
essarily deprive the mortgagee of his right to sue to enforce the personal
obligation of the mortgagor and, thereby, to obtain a deficiency, although
there was apparently a split of authority.'17 Moreover, strict foreclosure of
a land mortgage was by definition a judicial proceeding, and in any event
has now been abandoned in most jurisdictions in favor of sales, either
judicial or by power-of-sale mortgages." Clearly, though, the land mort
gagee could not by strict foreclosure cause a unilateral forfeiture of the
equity of redemption without judicial intervention.
In fact, in the sense that it is consensual rather than judicial in na
ture and involves not only the elimination of the debtor's e quity but also
the satisfaction of the underlying obligation, section 9-505(2) more closely
resembles the use of a deed absolute or deed in lieu of foreclosure. The
deed absolute is a purchase of the mortgagor's equity of redemption in
which the mortgagor conveys the fee simple title to the mortgagee in ex
change for the cancellation of the underlying obligation.119 Like section 9505(2), this procedure appears to have obvious advantages to both credi
tor and debtor: It is quicker than a foreclosure sale, nonadversarial, mini
mizes expenses, is confidential rather than public, and settles each party's
rights in a single transaction.60 On the other hand, the inherently superior
bargaining position of the mortgagee and potential for oppressive conduct
has led most courts to examine such transactions with the strictest scru
tiny for evidence of overreaching or, i n some cases, even to apply a pre
sumption of fraud that the mortgage e must rebut.61
Once again, however, important distinctions exist between the deed
absolute and section 9-505(2). The most obvious is that the deed absolute
requires affirmative participation by the d ebtor, who must execute a deed
55. 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 11 469 (rev. ed. 1987); 10 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN L A W OF REAL PROPERTY § 5160, at 133 (J.
Grimes repl. ed. 1957).
56. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 16.178, at 427 (A. Casner ed. 1 9 52); G. THO MP·
SON, supra note 55, § 5160, at 132.
57. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469, at 37-348; G. THOMPSON, sup ra
note 54, § 5162, at 139 (at common law there was no deficiency under strict foreclosure
unless court ordered a public sale); IV AMERICAN LAw or PROPERTY, supra note 56, §§
16. 178-79, at 429-33 (in England, suit on underlying obligation after foreclosure reopens
for�closure and allows redemption; opposite rule said to apply in America but courts have
spht).
.
58. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 56, § 16.179, at 431 -32; R. POWELL & P
35
ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469, at 37-346-47; G. THOMPSON,
supra note 55,§ 5160, at 1 34- ·
59. IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 56,§ 1 6.63, at 1 1 7 - 1 8; R. POWELL & P.
ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469.1 [1], at 37-348-49;
Kelley, Foreclosure by Contract: Deeds in
Lieu of Foreclosure in Missouri, 56 UMKC L. REV.
633 (1988).
ote
5o. R. PowELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55 11 469.1 (1]
at 37-349 · Kelley supra n
'
59, at 640-42.
· R. PowELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469.1(1], at 37-349; Kelley, supra note 59,
at 6 .
'

::

'

'
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in order to give up his equity. Section 9-505(2), on the other hand, is
satisfied if the debtor merely remains silent. Thus, section 9-505(2) can
operate essentially unilaterally. Moreover, the creditor who properly
utilizes section 9-505(2) eliminates junior lienors; this is not true of the
deed absolute and, indeed, may preclude its use.82
The personal property analogue to the Code was, as previously noted,
in the area of conditional sales. At common law, the simple act of repos
session barred the action on the debt by the doctrine of election.68 The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, while eschewing the election doctrine
generally,6' a llowed the seller to retain the goods "as his own property"
without obligation to the buyer and in discharge of all the buyer's obliga
tions, 811 unless the seller was subject to compulsory resale68 or the buyer
properly demanded resale within ten days of repossession.87
Unlike the Code, the prior uniform rule required no affirmative ac
tion by the secured party; presumably he could simply make a subjective
decision at any time after the debtor's ten-day grace period for redemp
tion68 or demand for sale had passed. For other reasons, however, it seems
likely that the "strict foreclosure" option was a more attractive one under
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) than under the UCC. To be
gin with, the highly regulated resale procedure under the UCSA was
fraught with potential for technical defects and subsequent litigation.
Thus, rather than take the steps necessary to preserve his deficiency
rights, a seller might very well have preferred to keep the goods under
section 23 and thereafter make whatever private disposition he could.
This, in turn, suggests a further reason why section 9-505(2) is often
an unrealistic remedy. By definition, the secured party under the UCSA
w as almost invariably a dealer; thus he would have at least the facilities
for sales of used goods, if not an eager market. The UCC, of course, gov
erns loan as well as sales transactions (or leases that are functionally se
curity transactions69) and it would obviously be the unusual case in which
a lender would wish to retain the goods instead of selling them. Indeed, at
le ast one well-known case, Reeves v. Foutz and Tanner, Inc.,70 held that
section 9-505 (2) cannot be used by a secured party who intends to resell
goods in the ordinary course of business, but rather that any subsequent
62. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, �· 469.1 [4], at 37-353; Kelley, supra note
59, at 665- 68.
63. For a discussion of the doctrine of election, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
64. Section 24 allowed the seller to sue for deficiency after repossession if a public sale
had been made. U.C.S.A §
. 24 ( 1 918).

65. Id. § 23.
66. Id. § 1 9; see supra note 45.
67 . U.C.S.A. § 20 (1918). The demand had to be written, delivered personally or by
registered mail, and served within IO days of the retaking. Upon receipt of the demand , the
seller was required to sell within 30 days at public auction. Id. §§ 1 9-20.
68. Id. § 18.
6 9. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) ( 1 987) ("security interest" includes leases intended as
security).
70. 94 N.M. 760, 617 P.2d 149 ( 1 980).
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sale is subject to section 9-504 and the debtor must be paid over any
surplus. If section 9-505(2) is limited to instances where the secured party
keeps the collateral for its own use, then obviously the provision is a dead
letter.11
Thus, if section 9-505(2) were applied only literally, it would seem to
be of very limited practical significance. The ordinary lender would be
interested not in the collateral but in realizing as much cash as possible to
apply to the debt, and would therefor e sell it. If other courts follow
Reeves, even purchase-money sellers will b e unlikely to make the election
to retain, since they, too, would ordinarily not be interested in personal
use of the collateral. Even if the rationale of Reeves is rejected, however,
the mandatory delay in section 9-505(2) will often make it u nattractive,
because the secured party will not want to risk further depreciation of the
collateral or market fluctuations.
Finally, and most importantly, with tangible personal property it will
be the unusual case where there is any appreciable equity in the collat
eral; the rapidity with which most collateral will depreciate almost guar
antees a deficiency. This fact creates an overwhelming incentive to resell
and sue for the remaining debt.72 Only where the collateral is accounts,
chattel paper, instruments (subject to separate default rules in section 950211), investment securities, precious metals, jewelry, or unique goods
71.

The facts of Reeves are fairly extreme. The debtors were semi-ill iterate Navajo

Indians; the secured party was a pawnbroker who used § 9-505(2) as a fairly heavy-handed
means of depriving the debtors of the surp lus value of the jewelry they pawned. It is no
surprise that the court wished to prevent a w indfal l; however, a blanket holding that § 9-

505(2) can never be used by one who intends t o r es e l l is an overly broad means to accom
plish this. A more appropriate device wou l d b e to find a violation of the secured party's
implied duty of good faith under § 1-203, rendering the surplus recoverable by the deb tors
under § 9-507(1) or § 1-103. Cf. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1226-27:
Now what is to happen when a secured party makes a proposal to retain, say, a
million dollars' worth of collateral in satisfaction of a hundred-thousa nd-dollar
debt-or a thousan d dollars' worth of collateral in satisfaction of hundred-dollar
debt-and, through oversight in the million- dollar case or ignorance in the thou
sand-dollar case, no one who is qualified to object does so within the statu tory
time limits? The courts will do what they a lways have done and a lways will do.
If fraud is a l l eged by someone who has standing to complain of it, the allegation

will be inqui red into. If the fraud is p r oved, the offending transaction w i l l be set
aside and the court will devise an appropriate remedy.

72. Gilmore notes that the demand for a deficiency was the death knell of both the
rea l estate strict foreclosure action and the conditional sel ler's election of remedies. G. GIL
MORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1221.
73.

�

See U.C.C.

§ 9-502 (1987):
(1} When so agreed and in any event on defaul t the secured party is entitled

t notify an account debtor or the ob ligor on a n instrument to make payment to
him whether or not the assignor was theretofore making col lections o n the col
lateral, and also to take control of any p r oceeds to which he
is entitled under
Section 9- 306.

(2) A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge back unco l l ec ted
collateral or otherwise to full or limited r ecourse
against the debtor and who
undertak�s to collect from the account debtors
or obligors must proc eed in a
commercially reasonable manner and may deduct
his reasonable exp e nses of re-
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would there likely be even a rough equivalency between the value of the
collateral and the debt owed. Since only such equivalency would make
section 9-505(2) appealing, its voluntary use would seem severely
circumscribed.
But, of course, section 9-505(2) has, as I have already discussed, not
been limited to the secured party's option. Its involuntary imposition by
courts against creditors has assumed a position of far greater prominence
than its occasional voluntary election. I now turn to an analysis of those
cases.
II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 9-505(2)

As previously discussed, courts faced with violations of the resale
provisions of section 9-504 have fashioned three disparate responses to
the problem: The absolute bar rule, the rebuttable presumption rule, and
the damages only rule. 74 A similar pattern has emerged in cases where the
debtor's grievance is not defective notice of resale but, rather, either de
lay in or failure to sell. In these cases, section 9-505(2) has frequently
been invoked by debtors asserting an implied agreement by the secured
party to retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt. The result of
such a finding would be the loss of a right to a deficiency judgment. Just
as with section 9-504, three distinct views have emerged. One extreme I
characterize as the "delay is enough" cases: An unreasonable delay in dis
posing of the collateral will be deemed an implied retention in satisfac
tion of the debt.71 The intermediate view I call the "delay plus facts"
cases: Delay alone will not cause the imposition of section 9-505(2), but
may be coupled with other facts that collectively evince an implied agree
ment to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.76 At the other
extreme are the "damages only" cases: Section 9-505(2) is triggered only
by an affirmative election of the secured party and will not be deemed to
apply by implication. These courts limit the debtor to a set�off for dam
ages under section 9-507.77 I discuss representative cases from each group.

alization from the collections. If the security agreement secures an indebtedness,
the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless other
wise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But, if the underlying trans
actio n was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any
surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreements so provides.
74.

For a discussion of these rules, see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.

75. For a discussion of the "delay is e nough" cases, see infra notes 78-98 and accompa
nying text.
76. For a discussion of the "delay plus facts" cases, see infra notes 99·134 and accom
panying text.
77. For a discussion of the "damages only" cases, see infra notes 135-46 and accompa
nying text.
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"Delay is Enough" Cases

This article began with a brief discussion of Millican v. Turner,1• a
good example of the harshness that the "involuntary strict foreclosure"
doctrine can visit upon a secured party and the lack of profound court
analysis that these cases often evidence. Factually, the result in the case
seems almost outrageous, at least from the perspective of the secured
party. To begin with, the collateral had apparently been abandoned by
the debtor and was in terrible condition at the time of repossession . 78 The
facts suggest that Millican could probably not have sold the car without
first making a substantial investment in its refurbishing, an investment
90
which the UCC certainly sanctions b u t does not ordinarily demand.
Moreover, the denial of a deficiency judgment to Millican placed him in a
worse position than many purchase-money sellers, since he had been
forced by the assignee of the contract to repurchase it.81 Thus, Millican
lost not simply the value of the goods sold, but his cash as well. Under
those circumstances, to deprive him of any chance for a d eficiency judg
ment merely because of a delay in acting-something seemingly beyond
his control, to a large extent-is using a cannon to kill the proverbial
gnat. There is no evidence in the opinion either of overreaching by Milli
can or of any prejudice to Turner by the delay in filing suit after the
contract (and car) were reassigned to Millican.
This last point also illustrates why the imposition of involuntarY
strict foreclosure upon Millican was the sole avenue for Turner's relief.
Applied literally, the UCC would give T urner only damages for the delay
under section 9-507(1), and it is highly unlikely under the facts that any
could be proved. Lacking a direct means for policing Millican's supposed
misconduct, the court simply looked to section 9-505(2). In so doing, how
ever, the court acknowledged neither textual nor policy difficulties with
its analysis. Rather, to the court the issue was simple: "[U]nder what cir
cumstances may a creditor who has repossessed collateral be deemed to
have retained that collateral in satisfaction of the debt it secures."82 After
78. 503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987); see supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
79. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 290.
80. Under § 9-504, the collateral may be sold "in. its then <!ondition or following any
commercially reasonable preparation or processing." U.C.C. § 9-504(1) ( 1987 ) . To be sure,
there are a number of opinions that have suggested that to act "commerci ally reasonably"
the secured party may be required to make certain repairs prior to sale. A well-k nown exarn·
pie is Liberty Nat'! Bank & Trust v. Acme Tool Div. of Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir.
1�76) ; see generally Burke, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey--Secured Trans_a�
tions, 32 Bus. LAw. 1133, 1161-62 (1977) (discussing cases on both sides of the issue) . Milli
can, however, seems an unlikely candidate for the imposition of such requi rement. Give�
a
the low value of the collateral after default--a car sold at least twice previously and est•·
mated � be wor�h $800.00-the cost of repair seems clearly disproportionate to the incre
mental mcrease m the potential sales price.
81. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 290.
se
82· Id. at 291 . Of course, in phrasing the issue in that
manner (particularly by the u
0� the "deemed to" language), the court fairly clearly telegraphs the answer it intends to
give.
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court noted briefly the split

of authority on the issue and then, without further explanation, an
nounced its adoption of the "majority position":
[W] hen a creditor who has repossessed collateral retains it for an un
reasonably long period without disposing of it, he is deemed to have
retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt which it secures and is
thus precluded from suing o n the note, regardless of whether he has
notified the debtor that he is so retaining the collateral. What consti
tutes an unreasonable delay is a question for the trier of fact.83

The court did not, however, mention even in passing the debtor's right to
damages under section 9-507(1) as a possible alternative remedy. Nor did
it pause, even for a second, and reflect upon whether such a holding
makes any sense from a policy perspective in light of the lack of any sug
gestion of bad faith by Millican or injury to Turner.
Rather, the court posed only one simple question to be answered
upon remand, that is, whether Millican's retention of the car without dis
position 84 for a period of six months after reassignment of the contract
was an unreasonably long period. This determination, the court sug
gested, would depend upon "the types of collateral, how rapidly it depre
ciates, the market for such collateral, and other relevant circumstances."86
In light of the realities of Article 9 litigation and the all-or-nothing out
come that necessarily accompanies the court's legal holding, the prudent
creditor would seem to have but one rational course: settle for whatever
pittance he can get before trial on remand, and retreat to lick his wounds.
This lack of concern for either textual integrity or sound policy has,
unfortunately, characterized many of the "delay is enough" cases. Indeed,
the first reported case that would have been governed by the UCC, Brad

ford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Company,88 did not bother to cite section 9505 (2) at all. The case bears some striking similarities to Millican: A car,

purchased by a minor from Lindsey Chevrolet under a conditional sales
con tract in July 1965, was wrecked in November of the same year. No
further payments were made, 8 7 and the finance company to which the
contract had been sold repossessed the car and transferred the car and
contract back to Lindsey Chevrolet in April 1966, after Lindsey had satis
fied its repurchase obligation. Lindsey's only attempt at collection was
instituting suit against Bradford, who guaranteed the contract, in July
1966. Bradford's sole defense was that the repossession of the automobile
was a "waiver" of the right to collect on the debt.88
83. Id.
84. Id. The court never addressed the issue of whether the efforts Millican made to
sell the car during the interim met the standards of commercial reasonableness. Presu�a
bly, it deemed this irrelevant to an inquiry under § 9-505(2), making delay the only sahent
issue.
85 . Id.
86. 1 1 7 Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968).
87. Id. One assumes that the car was uninsured.
88. 1 1 7 Ga. App. at 783, 161 S.E.2d at 906. As previously noted, the common law
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In reversing a judgment n.o.v. for Lindsey Chevrolet, the court said
only the following:
Irrespective of whether the law prior to the Georgia Un iform Com
mercial Code . . . or the Commercial Code itself applies here, the result
is the same. See § 109 A-9-501 et seq. of the Georgia Uniform Commer
cial Code. The action of the holder in legally repossessing the secu rity
under a conditional sales contract, the rete ntion of the same with out
sale and without excuse for not selling, and without demand for pay
ment of the contract, for a period of approximately 50 days before suit
on the contract and for over 16 months from the time of filing suit to
the time of trial, constituted a rescission and satisfaction of the con
tract and no recovery could be had thereon.••

While the common law doctrine of election of remedies would undoubt
edly support this result, the court offered no explanation of how the pro
visions of part 5 of the UCC could be construed in the same fashion. The
most that can be said is that the court apparently drew upon a perceived
distinction between "accord and satisfaction" and "rescission and satis
faction," the term it employed in Bradford.'0

doctrine of election of remedies would clearly yield this result; however the rule was differ
ent under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
The court does not discuss which law pertained in Georgia prior to its adoption of the UCC
in 1962.
117 Ga. App. at 783, 161 S.E.2d at 906.
A slightly earlier case dealing with a defective sale, Braswell v. America n Nat'!
Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968), sheds further light on the cour t's meaning
and suggests that it was basing its rationale more on common law principles than on invol
untary strict foreclosure. In Braswell, the debtor claimed that the secured party 's failu re to
give him notice of a public sale barred a deficiency judgment, and the court agreed. In �he
course of the opinion, however, the court noted that the Code expressly requires affi rmative
action by the secured party to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, and provides
only a right to damages for noncompliance with the notice of sale provision s. 1 1 7 Ga. App .
at 701, 161 S.E.2d at 422. However, the court simply aligned itself with the " majority" of
a
courts that had found strict compliance with Part 5 a condition precedent to recovery of
deficiency. Id.
c
Alternatively, the court raised but did not elaborate on the issue of accord and satisfa
te
u
stit
con
tion. It stated merely that since the repossession was lawful, the taking could not
accord and satisfaction, but that this did not preclude a finding that the unde rlying contract
had been rescinded. Id. Presumably, it is this notion of implied rescission that formed the
basis of the decision in Bradford.
It is not, however, clear how the court could apply an accord and satisfaction analysis to
such a case in any event, since this presupposes both mutual consent and new consideration.
See supra note 9. Indeed the same court, in a contemporaneous opinion, rejected a debtor s
argument that his agreement to allow repossession only on condition of his release consti
tute an accord and satisfaction. The court stated that since the right to repossess was
pr�vided both by the security agreement and by 9-503 of the UCC, there was no consi. der
§
161
ation for an accord and satisfaction. Barnes v. Reliable
Tractor Co., 1 1 7 Ga. App. 777 ,
S.E.2d 918 ( 1968).
een
In any event, the accord and satisfaction or rescission
theories have generally not b
&
e�br�ced by later courts, although there is
ts
r
the occasional exception. See, e.g., Ace Pa
a·
v
�istrib., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 Ga. App.
"no
4, 245 S.E.2d 314 (1978) (discussing
can
tion of satisfaction" but holding against debtor
on facts). As previously noted, the Milli
89.
90.

·

'.

�
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While many cases have reached the same result as Millican,91 that
court's description of the "delay is enough" approach as the majority rule
is questionable. At least as many courts appear to have embraced the
"delay plus facts" analysis discussed in the next section. What is clear,
however, is that there is no necessary trend away from this simplistic ap
proach. Indeed, the most recent state high court to consider the issue, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota, seems to have taken this tack. In Wang
v. Wang,93 the collateral (motor vehicles) was repossessed by the secured
party in July 1980. In December 1984, after a trial on the underlying debt
and pending appeal, the secured party sold the collateral to himself at an
"auction" attended only by himself and his lawyer. The sale price was
$100.00; testimony indicated a value of approximately $30,000.00. In a
subsequent action against the debtor and guarantor for a deficiency, the
court reversed a verdict for the secured party. The court stated that not
withstanding the failure of the secured party to give notice under section
9-505(2) , "under the facts of this case [the secured party's] actions oper
ated as a de facto election of strict foreclosure. "93
Before turning to the "delay plus facts" cases, one other note is in
order. There is yet another approach to the delay problem that reaches
the same basic result as Millican and like cases but, perhaps, shows
somewhat greater concern for the textual integrity of the UCC. An illus
trative case is Alamosa National Bank v. San Luis Valley Grain Grow
ers, Inc. 94 There, the secured party repossessed its personal property
collateral and was still in possession at the time of trial, some 17 months
later. The trial court held that this was an implied election to retain in
court exp ressly rejected the accord and satisfaction theory. See supra note 9.
9 1 . See, e.g Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1989) (alternative
holding); In re Myers, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1420 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1976); Schultz v. Dela
ware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576 (Del. Super. 1976); Haufier v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
893 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (erroneously applies 603 price rule to § 9-505(2)); Northern Fin.
Corp. v. C hatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Farmer's
State Bank v. Ballew, 626 P.2d 337 (Okla. App. 1981) (dictum); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes,
711 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App. 1986) (tort liability imposed in addition to forfeiture of defi
ciency); Service Chevrolet, Inc. v. Sparks, 99 Wash. 2d 199, 660 P.2d 760 (1983); Swanson v.
May, 40 Wash.
App. 148, 697 P.2d 1013 ( 1985) (commercial transaction).
92. 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989).
93. Id. at 746. Wang is one of a number of cases that are difficult to classify because of
the lack of detail and precision in the court's analysis. The court shows no awareness of the
split of authority nationally and cites only a prior case, First Bank v. Haberer Dairy & Farm
Equipm ent, 4 1 2 N.W.2d 866 (S.D. 1987), which refused to apply involuntary strict foreclo
sure because the secured party sued on the debt, attempted to sell the collateral, and noti
.
fied the debtors that it was not accepting the collateral in full satisfaction. The only sahent
facts cited in Wang to distinguish Haberer, however, were the longer delays in filing suit
and making the sale. Thus, the court does not appear to be basing its determination of
"intent" upon anything other than temporal factors.
Of course, the case could easily have been disposed of on the basis of the rebuttable
Presumption rule that the court adopted for violations of § 9-504. See supra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text. For procedural reasons, however, the court chose to allow the jury ver
dict on this issue to stand.
.,

94.

756 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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satisfaction under section 9-505(2).911 The appellate court reversed on this
basis, holding in a case of first impression that section 9-505(2) is trig
gered only where the secured party gives the prescribed notice. The court
then, however, analogized unreasonable retention of collateral to failure
to give notice, and decided that the rebuttable presumption rule that Col
orado had adopted with respect to the latter should be applied:
[W}e hold that

a

secured party in possession of the collateral who

neither disposes of it, nor elects in writing to retain it in satisfaction of
the obligation and is determined to have retained the collateral in a
commercially unreasonable manner, must overcome the presumption
that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt a n d un
less rebutted, the obligation of the debtor has been satisfied."

Finding support for the trial court's decision that the length of the delay
was unreasonable, the court remanded for determination o f whether the
creditor could rebut the presumption. 87
Since there will frequently be extensive delay in disposition of the
collateral, the Alamosa National Bank approach offers courts a means for
denying a deficiency without encountering the technical difficulties in ap
plying section 9-505(2). While it is too early to tell whether other courts
will follow suit, the development of the law in this area bears watching.9'

B. "Delay Plus Facts" Cases
Although a number of jurisdictions have now embraced the "delay
plus facts" approach, perhaps the most fully developed line of authority
for illustrative purposes comes from Texas. The leading case is Tanen·
baum u. Economics Laboratory, Inc.89 The opinion is brief and, in some
respects, confusing. The secured party, Economics Laboratory, sold com
curity
?1ercial laundry equipment to the debtor, Tanenbaum, taking a se
interest by virtue of two conditional sales contracts. 100 The equipment
was nonfunctional, and after two years Tanenbaum tendered the equip·
ment to Economics, asking that his account be fully credited. The secured
Part� repossessed, but deeming repair of the equipment prohibitively ex·
pensive, scrapped it and sued for a deficiency. Tanenbaum received no
notice prior to this action.101 The trial court entered a summary judgment
for the debtor on the basis that the secured party's action in retaining the
collateral barred the recovery of a deficiency. The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, however, reversed that decision, holding that the rebuttable pre95. Id. at 1026.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1027. The court also noted that the debtor could recover damages under § 9507(1) to the extent they could be proved. Id. at 1026.
98. As of this writing, Alamosa National Bank has been followed in only one case
(from the same court), Tajalli v. Gharibi, 758 P.2 d 190 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
CH
99· 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982), noted in 34 BAYLOR L. REV.
605 (1982) '· 14 TEX. TE
L. REV. 513 (1983).
100. Tanenbaum, 628 S W.2d at 770.
101. Id.
.
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sumption rule102 under section 9-504 should be applied where the secured
creditor retains the collateral with neither disposition under section 9-504
nor proposal to retain under section 9-505(2), but merely gives credit for
the value of the collateral. 10 1 The effect, of course, was still to deny the
deficiency judgment unless the secured party could overcome the pre
sumption, but presumably this was a more palatable alternative than be
ing kicked out of court altogether by invocation of the involuntary strict
foreclosure doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and instituted the trial court's
judgment. 10' In its view, section 9-504 and 9-505 were conceived as com
plete alternatives: The legislative intent was to force the creditor to make
"an election to either sell the repossessed collateral pursuant to section 9504 or to retain the collateral in complete satisfaction of the debt pursu
11
ant to section 9 -505 . "10 In so doing, the court rejected the rebuttable
presumption rule and adopted the absolute bar rule as the law of
Texas. 106
On the issue of the secured party's retention in the case at hand,
tho ugh, the court's holding was fairly narrow. Rather than simply adopt
ing the im plied strict foreclosure principle wholesale, the court limited
the resu lt to the circumstances of the cause: "By destroying the collateral
[Economics Laboratory] elected to be governed by section 9- 505, and
therefore is not entitled to a deficiency judgment. "107
Tanenbaum was a short and strange opinion that evinced little un
der standing of the subtleties of the 9-505(2) issue. Indeed, it is not at all
cle ar that the court was basing the result solely on section 9-505(2), given
its exp ress holding that a creditor who disposes of collateral under section
9 - 504 m ust give notice or forfeit his deficiency rights. 101 It was at least

p oss ible, though, that Tanenbaum could be read as imposing a 9-505(2)

"election" only on a secured party who destroys the collateral, otherwise
confining the statute to its literal place in the statutory scheme.
Predictably, that has not consistently been the course of subsequent
cases . Rather, lower courts have read Tanenbaum as sanctioning the in
voluntary strict foreclosure doctrine, so long as facts, of variable degrees

102.

Economics Lab., Inc. v. Tanenbaum, 620 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1981), rev'd, 628

S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982). For

an

explanation of the rebuttable presumption rule, see supra

notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 841.
Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d at 772.
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 772 (in order for creditor to sue for deficiency after disposition of the col

106.
lateral in a commercially reasonable manner, he must comply with notice requirements of §
9-504).
107.
108.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. The court might have viewed scrapping the collateral

tion" under section 9-504(3), thus providing

an

as a form of "disposi
alternative basis for its decision. In any

event, it seems that this part of the opinion is basically surplusage to the core holding and
serves mainly to announce prospectively the adoption of the absolute bar rule under § 9-504.
For fur ther discussion of the ambiguities in the opinion, see 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 605, 628-33
(1982).
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of strength, indicate an intent on the part of the secured party to have
elected to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. 1 09
For example, in Burton u. National Bank of Commerce of Dallas,11 0
the debtor alleged that, after default, he was induced to deliver the collat
eral (a truck) voluntarily to a bank officer by virtue of a representation
that the bank had found a buyer for the truck who would extinguish the
debt. The debtor argued waiver, estoppel, and accord and satisfaction in
defense of the deficiency action.111 In reversing a verdict for the secured
party, the court placed the case within the rule of Tanenbaum: Jury find
ings for the debtor on the issues of waiver and estoppel "conclusively es
tablish an election by bank to take the collateral in satisfaction of
Burton's debt, and . . . became final and irrevocable upon Burton's deliv
ery of the collateral security to the bank. " 1 1 2
The secured party fared better in Piney Point Investment Corpora
tion u. Photo Design, Inc. ,11 3 a case involving delay in disposition. The
secured parties sold a graphic design business to the debtors, reserving a
security interest in the assets to secure a purchase money note. After de
fault, the secured parties repossessed the business on February 1, 1982,
and on March 30 their attorney notified the debtors by letter that a pri
vate sale would be made on or after April 15, 1982.1 14 No sale was made
at that time, though, because the secured parties reestablished the busi
ness. Two assetsm were sold in September 1982 to meet expenses, but no
other sales had been made at the time of trial, which occurred two years
after repossession, nor were any efforts to have such a sale made.
Nonetheless, the court rejected the debtor's implied strict foreclosure
argument. 1 1 8 It read Tanenbaum narrowly as imposing the forfeiture of
the deficiency because the destruction of the collateral had d eprived the
debtor of any opportunity to rebut the creditor's subjective valuation of
the collateral. In Piney Point, however, the secured parties gave notice of
the sale, and the property was at all times available for appraisal.117 Thus,
the court was unwilling to apply section 9-505(2), since the secured par
ties had given express notice of sale. According to the court, the mere fact
that the secured parties "repossessed the equipment and may have re
mained in possession of a substantial part of it, does not, standing alone,
109. Prior to Tanenbaum, the only reported Texas appellate court case o n the issue
had held t h at § 9-505(2) was triggered only by express notice. See Roylex, Inc. v. E. F.
Johnson Co., 617 S.W . 2d 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 98 1 ) (disapproved in Tanenba um) .
110.

679 S.W.2d 1 1 5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
at 1 16.

111. Id.
112. Id.

at 119. C andidly, it must be said that the court's opinion on § 9- 505 (2) is at
be�t vague and c� nfusing; indeed, it is not clear w hether
e
the debtor was given notice of th
�ltimate sale (which does seem to have been made) and whether any m aterial delay in m ak·
mg the sale occurred.

113.
114.
115.

691 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).

Id.

This comp l ied with the requiremen ts o f § 9-504(3)
for private sales.
No other identification of the property
sold was made. Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.

116.
117. Id.

at 769.
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constitute an election t o retain the collateral i n full satisfaction of the
indebtedness. "111
A more conventional "delay plus facts" approach was taken in In re
Boyd. 11 11 There, the secured party repossessed, after default, a boat, mo
tor, and trailer. Two months later, the debtor filed his petition in bank
ruptcy. 120 In response to the bank's motion to lift the automatic stay, the
court held that the bank had taken the collateral in satisfaction of the
debt. Although no section 9-505(2) notice had been given, the debtor al
leged (and the court believed) that he had seen bank personnel using the
boat. The court concluded that the bank's failure to sell the boat within a
reasonable time, coupled with its conversion of the boat to its own use,
resulted in an election to satisfy the debt under section 9-505. m
An even broader interpretation of Tanenbaum is found in Texas Na

tional Bank

v.

Karnes, 121 which appears

to align itself with the "delay is

enough" line of cases. There, the bank repossessed a van owned by one of
the debtors, D avid Karnes (a minor), and attempted to set off the balance
of the note against a savings account of his parents, one of whom (Alice)
was a co-signor of his note. The parents thereafter sued the bank for
"con version" of the credit balance from their account and for exemplary
damages. At the time of trial, five years later, for unexplained reasons,

the van had never been sold. 118
In an opinion that should have a rather jarring effect on secured
lenders, the court held that the delay in disposition of the collateral
barred a deficiency by operation of law and upheld an award of exem
plary damages (though reducing them from $50,000 to $20,000).114 On the
issue of involuntary strict foreclosure, the court's pronouncements were
exceedingly brief:
If the bank, or any secured creditor, retains collateral for the length of
time, as was done in this case, such secured creditor is not entitled to
recover deficiencies. Since the bank retained the collateral, it, by opera·
tion of law, elected to take the collateral in full satisfaction of the

debt.ua

Thus, the court seemed to require nothing beyond excessive delay to trig
ger section 9-505( 2).
On its facts, this is probably unremarkable; five years is a long time,

1 18. Id. at 770. Moreover, the court upheld the award of a deficiency judgment. Al
though the failure to sell the collateral was not commercially reasonable, the secured parties
met the burden of proving that the value of the collateral was less than the debt, and the
debtor received full credit for that amount. Id.
1 19. 73 Bankr. 122 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
1 20. Id. at 124.
121. Id. at 124-25. It might be noted that the bankruptcy judge in Boyd did not cite

Tanenbaum.

122.
123.
124.
125.

7 1 1 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 392 (citing Tanenbaum).
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and the bank curiously offered no explanation for its failure to act. More
ominous, though, was the court's holding on tort liability. On the bases
that (1) the van was repossessed in May 1979; (2) $3,474.41 was deducted
from the account of the parents, Dewey and Alice, in July 1979; (3) the
parents learned of the deduction in December 1979; and (4) the bank had
possession of the van at trial, in July 1984, the court reached this
conclusion:
We hold the following to be torts, or certainly of a tortious nature,
on the part of the bank:
1. In failing to make a reasonable disposition of the collateral;
2. In keeping possession of the collateral beyond a reasonable time;
3. In taking or converting the money out of the savings account
after losing its right to offset;
4. In failing to timely notify Dewey and Alice of the deduction from
their savings account;
5. In concealing the fact from Dewey and Alice that the bank had
deducted from their savings the sum of $3,474.41 for the period of time
from July, 1979, to December, 1979;
6. In failing to return the certificate of title to the van while having
possession of the van from May, 1979, to July, 1984; and,
7. In failing to establish the value of the collateral in a commer
cially reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after repossess
ing the same. 128

The court concluded that each of these acts or omissions was a separate
and independent tort, and that cumulatively the actions justified the im
position of exemplary damages.127
In deeming a commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral
under article 9 to be a new species of tort, Karnes is certainly a case that
bears watching, although in this respect it may fit more comfortably
within the burgeoning field of lender liability.118 That, however, is beyond
the scope of this article. The more immediate question is whether Karnes
foreshadows a shift among lower Texas courts towards an expansive view
of Tanenbaum's involuntary strict foreclosure theory.
In any event, Texas is far from the only jurisdiction to embrace the
"delay plus facts" interpretation of section 9-505(2). A substantial num
ber of cases have held, at least in effect, that some facts evidencing "in
tent" to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt must augment the
proof of mere delay before section 9-505(2) can be involuntarily im
posed.129 Indeed, it seems likely that this (like the rebuttable presump126. Id. at 396.
127. Id. at 396-97.
128. See generally Note, The Doctrine of Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 85
(1988); Comment, Lender Liability: Good Faith and Demand Notes, 64 TUL. L. REV. 187
(1989).
129. In addition to the Texas cases already cited, see United States v. Excellair, Inc. ,
637 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Colo. 1986); In re Deephouse Equip. Co., 38 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1984) (useful survey of three-part split in case law); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Priority Elec. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 81 7
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tion rule under section 9-504) will become, if it is not already, the
"majority" rule, if for no other reason than the appeal that compromise
or intermediate positions always have for courts.
Perhaps most noteworthy is that adoption of the "delay plus facts"
approach is much more likely to augur well for the secured party, since
the court may conclude that the debtor has not marshalled sufficient
proof to establish the necessary (and, of course, fictitious) "intent." A
well reasoned case in point is Nelson u. Arms tro ng.180 Armstrong, an
equip ment dealer, repossessed a tractor after default and, pursuant to a
stip ulation with Nelson made four and one-half m onths thereafter, sold
the equi p ment. Nelson sued Armstrong for fraudulent m isrepresentation,

and Armstrong counterclaimed for a deficiency judgment.1 81 The trial
co urt awarded Nelson damages and denied the deficiency on, inter alia,
th e grounds that Armstrong's delay in selling barred recovery under sec
tion 9-505(2 ). 182
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed on the issue of implied retention.
The court refused, however, to hold that section 9-505( 2) applies only
where the statutory proposal is made. Rather, the court left open the pos
sib ility of involuntary strict foreclosure, preferring to base its conclusion
on the weakness of the debtor's proof:
While strict compliance with the written notice provision of [sec
tion 9-505(2)] may not be essential where the debtor is claiming that
the secured party has retained the collateral, we think that the creditor
must in some way have manifested an intent to accept the collateral in
full satisfaction of the debtor's obligation . . . .
As we view it, [section 9-505(2)] is not a device for policing the
conduct of secured parties vis-a-vis their debtors, but rather a statutory
analogue to the common law concept of accord and satisfaction . . . .
While the proverbial meeting of the minds is not essential under (sec
tion 9-505 (2) ], a debtor seeking to avail himself of the statute's recipro
cal protections must still establish that the secured party intended to
retain the collateral in lieu of selling it for the debtor's account.
The determination of what will sufficiently manifest a secured
party's intent to retain collateral in satisfaction of the obligation must
await development in the context of future cases. It is enough for the

(Alaska 1973) ( use of collateral by secured party as well as delay); ITT Terryphone Corp. v
Modems Plus, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 710, 320 S.E.2d 784 ( 1984) (question of fact); Wisconics
Eng'g, Inc. v. Fisher, 466 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Schmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 219
Neb . 205, 361 N. W.2d 557 ( 1985); Winters Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker, 66 Ohio App.
2d 3 1, 4 1 9 N.E.2d 890 (1979); FDIC v. Tempest Fugat, H.L.I., Inc., 75 Or. App. 536, 707
P.2d 81 ( 1985) , reu. denied, 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986); Durhahl v. Bank of Casper, 718
P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1986). See also Deutsche Credit Corp. v. Woodard, 719 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) (fact question as to whether secured party agreed to accept surrender of collat
eral in satisfaction of debt; § 9-505 not cited); First Nat'! Bank of Pa. v. Cole, 293 Pa. Super.
791, 435 A.2d 1 283 (1981) (assuming arguendo that implied election is possible under § 9505, no such evidence presented).
130. 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1 100 (1978).
131.
1 32.

Id. at 425, 582 P.2d at 1 103.
Id.
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present to hold that Armstrong's mere failure to attempt resale of farm
equipment for a period of four and a half months does not adequately
manifest his intent to retain it. m
The court's candid remark that section 9-505(2) is not a policing tool
is telling, for clearly there is nothing in the history of the provision to
suggest that the drafters envisioned it to operate in the fashion espoused
by the debtor. 1 84 On the other hand, the refusal of the court to reject
outright the implied application of section 9-505(2) may also evince an
unstated uneasiness with the effectiveness of the express remedial provi
sions of part 5 o f article 9. That tension is clearly exposed in the final
class of cases.

C.

"Damages Only" Cases

While the courts of New York have not been uniform in their ap
proach to section 9-505(2), perhaps the leading case nationally in re
jecting involuntary strict foreclosure is S.M. Flickinger Company, Inc. v.
18 Genesee Corporation.131 The plaintiff, Flickinger, subleased property
to Genesee to operate a "Super Duper Food Market" and loaned it
$230,000. Upon default, the plaintiff by agreement took possession of the
1
store, fixtures, and inventory. It then sued for a judgment on the note. 1 3
The court found the defendants bound to their agreement regarding
the disposition and valuation of the inventory. The agreement did not,
however, address fixtures, and no attempt was made to dispose of them.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that failure to
comply with section 9-504 would require the secured party to prove the
fair market value of the collateral and the resulting deficiency (the rebut
table presumption approach).187 In so doing, however, the court rejected
the position that section 9-505(2) could b e imposed involuntarily:

By its terms the statute mak�s the election to retain the collateral
in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt optional with the creditor
and it provides that the option is to be exercised by written notice to
the debtor. There was no communication between the parties to this
action, however, which may be construed as an election by the creditor
to take the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt, and an election
133. Id. at 430, 582 P.2d at 1 108. The court remanded, however, for determination of
whether the delay rendered the ultimate sale commercially unreasonable and what legal
effect the trial court's findings on this issue would have on Armstrong's deficiency rights. Id.
at 432, 582 P.2d at 1 100.
134. For a discussion of the history of § 9-505(2), see supra notes 50-53 and accompa
.
nying text.
135. 71 A.D.2d 382, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). Two earlier cases (one
federal) took a different tack. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elec. C orp., 435
F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("delay plus facts" case holding that creditor whose agent
converted property and prevented resale was barred from deficiency)· Northern Fin. Corp.
v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 674 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1967) (" delay is
enough" case).
136. 18 Genesee, 71 A.D.2d at 383-84, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75.

:
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should not be implied when the means for certainty are spelled out in
the statute. The concern , of course, is that the creditor, having pro

ceeded without notifying the debtor of his intention, may act to the
debtor's disadvantage. But section 9-505 was not designed to protect
the debtor from a wrongful sale . . . . If the secured party fails to
comply with the provisions of Article 9, the debtor may protect his
rights by the remedies available pursuant to section 9-507. He may

restrain or compel disposition of the collateral, or if the disposition has
already occurred, he may charge the creditor with any loss occasioned
by its unauthorized conduct. Neither the provisions nor the purposes of
the Code require that plaintiff forfeit its entire claim, however, and the
Code should not be interpreted to permit the uncertainty of a jury trial
on that issue here. '88

18 Genesee thus states, in clear and forceful terms, a seemingly over
powering textual rebuttal to the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine.
Its strength has been such that subsequent New York cases have consist
ently followed it,139 and certainly a respectable number of other jurisdic
tions have reached the same conclusion.140 Indeed, in a recent decision,
Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas,1·0 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit aligned itself with 18 Genesee. In Warnaco, the seller of a
1 38.
1 39 .

Id. at 384, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 76 {emphasis added).
Bank of Boston Int '! of Miami v . Arguello Tefel, 644 F. Supp. 1423 {E.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Emergency Beach Corp., 48 Bankr. 341 {S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hanam, B.V. v. Kittay,
589 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Mitchell, 94 A.D.2d 971, 464
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1983); Marine Midland Bank v. Connelly, 79 A.D.2d 1 102, 435 N.Y.2d 850
(1981 ) .
140. See, e.g., Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173 {1st Cir. 1989) {alternative
holding); In re Amador, 596 F.2d 428 { 10th Cir. 1979); In re Nardone, 70 Bankr. 1010 {D.
Mass. 1987); Fletcher v. Cobuzzi, 499 F. Supp. 694 {W.D. Pa. 1980); Everett v. Parts, Inc., 4
Ark. App. 2 13, 628 S.W.2d 875 (1982); Florida First Nat'! Bank at Pensacola v. Martin, 449
So. 2d 86 1 {Fla. Ct. App. 1984) {failure to give § 9-505(2) notice obliged secured party to sell
under § 9-504); Ayares-Eisenberg-Perrine Datsun, Inc. v. Sun Bank, 455 So. 2d 525 {Fla. Ct.
App. 1984); McCullough v. Mobiland, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 260, 228 S.E.2d 146 (1976); Com
mercial Fin., Ltd. v. American Resources, Ltd., 6 Haw. App. 667, 737 P.2d 1120 (1987);
Stensel v. Stensel, 63 Ill. App. 3d 639, 380 N.E.2d 526 ( 1978) {failure to give notice not § 9505(2) election); Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 ( 1 972); FDIC v. Air Atlantic,
Inc., 389 Mass. 950, 452 N.E.2d 1 143 ( 1983); Priggen Steel Bldg. Co. v. Parsons, 350 Mass.
62, 2 1 3 N.E.2d 252 (1966); Jones v . Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975)
(dictum); American Parts Sys. v. T & T Automotive, Inc., 358 N.W.2d 674 {Minn. Ct. App.
1984) {§ 9-505 applies only where statutory notice is given); Total Equip. Leasing Corp. v.
LaRue Inv. Corp., 357 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting implied application of §
9-505); Stensvad v. Miners & Merchants Bank, 163 Mont. 409, 5 1 7 P.2d 715 (1973) (secured
Party notifies debtors of intent to enforce security interest, debtors cannot rely upon § 9-505
to contend that there is a "recision and satisfaction" of debt); Brownstein v. Fiberonics
Indus., 1 10 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 ( 1970); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); Winters Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker,
66 Ohio App. 2d 31, 419 N.E.2d 890 ( 1 979) (secured party should be able to sue on debt
withou t recourse against collateral); Farmers State Bank of Parkston v. Otten, 87 S.D. 161,
204 N.W.2d 178 (1973); IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607 {Utah 1989) (dictum). Cf.
Vogel v. Carolina Int'), Inc., 711 P.2d 708 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (unreasonable delay in send
ing § 9-505(2) notice can give rise to damages in conversion).
141. 872 F.2d 539 {2d Cir. 1989).
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business licensed trademarks to the buyer, with the agreement that upon

full payment the trademarks would be transferred for one dollar. The
court analogized the arrangement to a lease of equipment with a nominal
purchase option and held that the trademarks were obviously collateral.

When the buyer defaulted, the seller terminated the licensing agreement,
and the debtors claimed that this was a repossession that constituted ac
ceptance in full satisfaction under section 9-505 (2 ). 1 0

The court of appeals, however, predicted that the courts of Connecti
cut would reject the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine of Millican v.

Turner and follow 18 Genesee.as It stated its rationale as follows:

We believe that [Millican and like cases] depart from the scheme
of the UCC regarding repossessions of collateral and predict that Con
necticut would not follow them. If, after repossession of collateral, a
creditor does nothing it may be compelled by the debtor to make some
disposition under section 9-507. Even if a debtor does not seek such an
order, however, the creditor must deduct the value of the collateral at
the time of repossession from the outstanding balance of the debt. In
that scheme, there is no role for an extra-statutory rule that contem
plates repossession of collateral in full satisfaction of the debt where
the creditor fails to give the requisite notice and the value of repos
sessed collateral is less than the debt. Such a rule is not needed to pro
tect debtors because the value of the collateral must be deducted from
the outstanding balance whether or not the creditor acts to dispose of
the collateral. We therefore predict that Connecticut would not hold
that Warnaco accepted the collateral in satisfaction of the debt .144

It is difficult to fault the court's analysis in terms of statutory con
struction. Given the prominence of the Second Circuit in commercial

matters, it is quite possible that this decision will be an influential one.
Nonetheless, while I largely agree with the court's statutory analysis, I
believe that its conclusion falls short of a workable solution to the overall
Problem of creditor inaction. In effect, the 18 Genesee/Warnaco approach
.
simply shifts the dispute to another battlefield, that of commercially rea 
sonable disposition under section 9-504. The court in Warnaco implicitly
admitted as much, as it ultimately remanded the case for fact findings on
that question, noting the split of authority as to the appropriate sanction
for a " misbehaving creditor."14&
As already noted, however, there is no more clear-cut answ er from
a
the tatute on the issue of burden of proof of value and the righ t to
�
a
eficien y than on the implied application of section 9-50 5 (2) . us By fr m
�
18
in
mg the issue as one governed by sections 9-504 and 9-50 7, the courts

?

142.

Id. at 543.

that
Id. at 544. Although the case arose in New
York, the contract stipulated
.
Connecticut law would govern.
143·

144.

Id. at 544-45.

145.

Id. at 545.

146. For � discussion of the implied application
9-43
of § 9-505(2), see supra notes 2
and accompanying text.
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Genesee and Warnaco simply make all-important the individual state's
interpretation of the deficiency issue under those provisions. Thus, while
indisputably correct from an interpretative perspective, these decisions
beg the ultimate question of who must prove what to win, thus contribut
ing little or nothing to the quest for uniformity, certainty, and predict
ability in this area. It is not the jurisprudence to which one can turn for
solutions; article 9 itself must be amended to eliminate its ambiguities on
creditors' rights and debtors' protections, and to embrace a more realistic
approach to debtor relief.
CONCLUSION
Few would question that the Uniform Commercial Code was, collec
tively, a magnificent accomplishment. By the same token, article 9 is gen
erally conceded to be the crown jewel of the Code, its greatest
achievement on both the theoretical and practical levels.
The light of experience, however, has more than once shown that the
luster of article 9 has faded. The 1972 amendments corrected many of the
first generation of defects, but clearly others remain. It is hardly a new
insight that the resale and deficiency provisions of article 9 have worked
less than satisfactorily, and there have been recent calls to amend section
9-504 and 9-507 on this account. 147 This article has attempted to reinforce
this need for revision by reference to the related, but conceptually sepa
rate, problem of involuntary strict foreclosure under section 9-505(2).
The little commentary that this issue has heretofore attracted has
generally been critical of the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine.148 It
is but a covert tool and, as Karl Llewellyn accurately observed, covert
tools are not reliable ones.149 By the same token, however, it is unrealistic
to think that a court will eschew covert tools unless it is given efficient
ove rt tools with which to operate.
Clearly, change is mandated. It is my belief that, given the state of
the case law and its limited practical significance, the notice of retention
· procedure in section 9-505(2) should be abandoned. In its place, the Code
shoul d simply empower the debtor and secured party to enter into, after
default, any agreement regarding the settlement of the obligation that
they desire as an alternative to disposition under section 9-504.1 110 Such
147. See, e.g., Donaldson, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral
Under Article 9 of the UCC: The Question of Burden of Proof, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 307 (1988).
148. See, e.g., R. ANDERSON, supra note 12, § 9-505: 14, at 806-07; w. HAWKLAND, R.
LORD & C. LEWIS , supra note 12, § 9-505:09; but see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12,
§ 25-8, at 1212 (indicating agreement with "delay plus facts" approach). Commonly, discus
sions of § 9-505 either ignore the issue altogether or mention it only in passing without
crit ical analysis. See, e.g. , Coagan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 523-24
(19 73); Garner & Alber, Disposition Of Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 of the Tex.as
U.C. C., 11 Tux. 'I'EcH L. REv 563 ( 1980).
.

149. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939).
150. Elimination of § 9-505 would not, of course, prevent a court from invoking the
co mmon law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, which would presumably be preserved
un der § 1 - 103. As previously noted, however, the facts of most involuntary strict foreclosure
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an agreement can be adequately policed on typical contract law bases,
including the
specific
unconscionability. 1111

Code

provisions

on

good

faith161

and

In order to eliminate all vestiges of the involuntary strict foreclosure
doctrine as well as to resolve the existing split of authority on deficiencies
generally, section 9-504 should be amended to impose on the secured
party seeking a deficiency in all cases the burden of proof that he has in
every respect acted in a commercially reasonable manner.m Only such a
rule can remove the temptation for judicial tinkering with the statute;
likewise it is the only realistic approach to the problem, given the almost
universally superior resources of the secured party. Courts have more
than adequately demonstrated their lack of patience with a statutory
scheme that on its face offers debtors only a right to damages for creditor
misconduct. For purposes of symmetry, however, it likewise seems fair to
impose the burden of proof upon the debtor seeking affirmative relief
under section 9-507(1) (either compulsory disposition or damages), as op
posed to a debtor who is asserting a defense to a deficiency action. 1 5'
Of course, no such changes will create a world in which all creditors
act commercially reasonably, any more than all debtors will act fairly and
responsibly with respect to collateral after default. What is hoped, how·
ever, is that these changes would be a significant step towards more hon·
est, rational, and predictable decisionmaking in an area where disputes
are not only common but, like death and taxes, inevitable.

Pending such statutory revisions, counsel for repossessing creditors
should advise their clients, in any case in which disposition of the collat
eral might be significantly delayed, to give written notice to the debtor
expressly disclaiming any decision to retain in satisfaction unde r section
9-505(2). Affirmative communication with the debtor would seem the best
means of avoiding the involuntary strict foreclosure tarpit, since it is cer-

cases would not satisfy the accord and satisfaction doctrine, if it is properly applied. See
supra notes 6, 90.
While the special consumer goods rule in § 9-505 ( 1 ) may have been intended as a means
of consu�er protection, I likewise believe that it serves little purpose. As previously noted,
the rule is probably perverse in requiring a sale where 603 of the price has been paid; given
he rapid depreciation of most consumer goods, this would simply guarantee a deficiency
Judgment. See text at supra note 48.

�

151.

u.c.c. § 1 -203 (1987).

152.

Id. § 2-302.

i�. �

153. Cf.
3-307(3) (1987) (upon proof of defense, holder of negotiable instrument
must prove he 1s m all respects holder in due course). See also J. WHITE & R. SUM MERS,
supra note 12, § 25-16, at 1238-39 (noting that some courts have read in this requirement).

�

154. See Donaldson, supra note 147, at 325-26 (suggesting this approach to § 9- 507
;
But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-507(1) (Supp. 1990) (statutorily adopting "damages only
9
approa�h to vi�lat�ons of § 9-504); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-16 , at 123

.
(recogmzmg t 1s view but expressing skepticism that the burden of proof has much eff�ct).
.
Whether sh1ftmg the burden of proof will, in fact, change the results of many cases 1s a
matter that cannot easily be empirically established. Nonetheless, there seems to be little ·
sense in terms of a normative standard in imposing the burden on the party for whom proof
costs are clearly disproportionate and who has inferior access
the basic facts at issue.

�

to

1991)
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tainly difficult for a court t o infer an intent that is inconsistent with the
creditor's own declared one. Written notice can serve

as

no guarantee,

though, since actions ultimately speak more loudly than words.

